order began by directing that "no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac" should "be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as in the opinion of the General-in-chief and the commanders of army-corps[1] shall leave said city entirely secure." To this restriction no exception certainly could be taken. That "Washington should be provided with a sufficient garrison in the event of the army leaving its immediate vicinity, was assuredly the dictate of common sense.

The order next directs that not more than two corps,—about -half the army,—shall be moved away from Washington " until the navigation of the Potomac . . . shall be freed from, enemy's batteries."

This direction shows that the President did not agree with General McClellan, that a movement of the army to the lower Chesapeake would necessitate a retreat of Johnston's army arid the evacuation of the Confederate batteries on the lower Potomac. And, inasmuch as even Mr. Lincoln must have thought it extremely unlikely that McClellan would undertake any movement with two corps only, we are not surprised to find in the last clause of this document, an express order " that the army and navy co-operate in an immediate effort to capture the

enemy's batteries upon the Potomac." For this operation, the period of ten days only is allowed, for it is expressly provided " that any movement . . . *en route* for a

[1] By an order of the same date,—March 8, 1862,— the President had divided the active army near Washington into four corps ; 5 W. R., 18. , 237.